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Mechanical Transmission of Enterotoxigenic Escherichia coli to Weaned
Pigs by People, and Biosecurity Procedures that Prevented such
Transmission
Abstract
Objectives: To determine whether people can mechanically transmit enterotoxigenic Escherichia coli (ETEC)
from infected to susceptible weaned pigs during direct pig contact and to determine biosecurity measures that
will prevent such transmissions.
Materials and Methods: One hundred and twenty-five 19- to 21-day-old weaned pigs, culture-negative fro
ETEC M1823B, were randomly allocated to six treatment groups housed in five separate isolation rooms.
Inoculated Pigs were offered 1.36 x 1010 to 8.92 X 1010 colony forming units of E coli mixed in strawberry
gelatin on two occasions. Pen Sentinels were housed with Inoculated Pigs. A caretaker fed pigs, checked
waterers, and directly contacted each group of pigs for 10 minutes daily for 10 consecutive days. THe
caretaker contacted Inoculated Pigs and moved directly to Direct Sentinels, recontacted Inoculated Pigs,
washed hands twice, changed outer-wear, then contacted Hand-wash Sentinels. The caretaker then
recontacted Inoculated Pigs, showered, changed outerwear, and contacted Shower Sentinels. Non-exposed
pigs had a separate caretaker.
Results: Escherichia coli M1823B was isolated from all 20 Inoculated Pigs, all five Pen Sentinels, 20 of 25
Direct Sentinels, and 23 of 25 Hand-wash Sentinels. The 25 Shower Sentinels and 25 Non-exposed Pigs
remained culture-negative for M1823B.
Implications: In this study, people mechanically transmitted E coli without extraordinary measures to enhance
caretaker contact with pig excretions and secretions beyond that which would occur in a typical pork
production unit. Hand washing and donning clean outerwear did not prevent E coli transmission. However,
showering and donning clean outerwear did prevent transmission.
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Summary
Objectives: To determine whether people
can mechanically transmit enterotoxigenic
Escherichia coli (ETEC) from infected to
susceptible weaned pigs during direct pig
contact and to determine biosecurity mea-
sures that will prevent such transmission.
Materials and methods: One hundred and
twenty-five 19- to 21-day-old weaned pigs,
culture-negative for ETEC M1823B, were
randomly allocated to six treatment groups
housed in five separate isolation rooms.
Inoculated Pigs were offered 1.36 × 1010
to 8.92 × 1010 colony forming units of
E coli mixed in strawberry gelatin on two
occasions. Pen Sentinels were housed with
Inoculated Pigs. A caretaker fed pigs,
checked waterers, and directly contacted
each group of pigs for 10 minutes daily for
10 consecutive days. The caretaker con-
tacted Inoculated Pigs and moved directly
to Direct Sentinels, recontacted Inoculated
Pigs, washed hands twice, changed outer-
wear, then contacted Hand-wash Sentinels.
The caretaker then recontacted Inoculated
Pigs, showered, changed outerwear, and
contacted Shower Sentinels. Non-exposed
pigs had a separate caretaker.
Results: Escherichia coli M1823B was iso-
lated from all 20 Inoculated Pigs, all five
Pen Sentinels, 20 of 25 Direct Sentinels,
and 23 of 25 Hand-wash Sentinels. The 25
Shower Sentinels and 25 Non-exposed Pigs
remained culture-negative for M1823B.
Implications: In this study, people me-
chanically transmitted E coli without ex-
traordinary measures to enhance caretaker
contact with pig excretions and secretions
beyond that which would occur in a typical
pork production unit. Hand washing and
donning clean outerwear did not prevent
E coli transmission. However, showering
and donning clean outerwear did prevent
transmission.
Keywords: swine, post-weaning diarrhea,
Escherichia coli, transmission, biosecurity
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Post-weaning diarrhea in swinecaused by enterotoxigenic Escheri-chia coli (ETEC) may be an impor-
tant cause of mortality in weaned pigs and
has become a frustration in many pork
producers’ units.1–4 Postweaning E coli
diarrhea was reported as the most regular
disease problem of “large-scale” pig farms,
producing significant losses in weaned
pigs.3 The cost of E coli diarrhea in all ages
of pigs was estimated at £11.5 million
(US$18.4 million) per year for the UK
national herd of approximately 800,000
sows.4 Post-weaning diarrhea and death
loss caused by E coli emerged as a concern
in Ontario in late 1997.2 A Canadian
study estimated that mortality resulting
from post-weaning E coli diarrhea in a 500-
sow herd would cost CAN$20,000 annu-
ally.2 Vaccination, medication, optimiza-
tion of nutrition and sanitation, and
minimization of management stressors are
common procedures used to control E coli
diarrhea in pigs.3,5 However, in some
herds, post-weaning diarrhea due to E coli
persists despite vaccination, aggressive use
of antibiotics, and improved facility sanita-
tion. Consequently, in these herds, other
risk factors contributing to the spread of
colibacillosis must be considered. In 2000,
a group of approximately 20 veterinarians
met to discuss the problem of post-weaning
E coli diarrhea in the industry. This study
was initiated as a result of that meeting, to
address the possibility that ETEC is spread
by caretakers tracking the pathogen from
infected to susceptible groups of pigs. In
support of field observations, we have pre-
viously shown that transmissible gastroen-
teritis virus (TGEV) of swine was mechani-
cally spread under experimental conditions
in which an investigator moved from
TGEV-inoculated pigs to susceptible pigs
without using biosecurity procedures. The
investigator was in direct contact with pigs
and their secretions and excretions for 10
minutes, twice daily, for 2 weeks.6 Similar
transmission of E coli is likely, considering
that spread of E coli occurs through fecal-
oral transmission and some strains survive
for 47 days in bovine manure and 21
months in ovine manure under fluctuating
environmental conditions.7
The specific objectives of this study were to
determine whether people can mechani-
cally transmit ETEC from infected to
susceptible weaned pigs during direct pig
contact and to determine which biosecurity
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measures prevent such transmission under
the conditions of the study.
Materials and methods
Animals and experimental groups
One hundred and twenty-five 19- to 21-
day-old weaned pigs from a single source
were used. The source herd had no history
of post-weaning diarrhea caused by E coli.
Fecal samples from weaned pigs at the
source herd, collected prior to the study,
were negative for the E coli strain used as
inoculum. Moreover, all pigs were sampled
on arrival (Day 0) to verify that none car-
ried a lactose-positive organism resistant to
the concentrations of nalidixic acid and
tetracycline found in the agar, and pigs
used in the study were all negative for the
challenge strain of ETEC M1823B by fecal
culture. Pigs were randomly allocated to
one of six treatment groups: Inoculated
Pigs, Pen Sentinels, Direct Sentinels,
Hand-wash Sentinels, Shower Sentinels, or
Non-exposed Pigs (Table 1).
Facilities, environment, and diet
Each group of pigs was maintained in a
separate room connected by a common
hallway. Pen Sentinels were housed in the
same room as Non-exposed Pigs for the
first 17 hours of the study to avoid contact
with challenge-inoculum. Rooms were
3.81 m × 5.18 m with sealed, epoxy-coated
floors and two drains. Pigs were housed in
2.42 × 1.82-m pens with elevated, plastic-
coated expanded metal flooring, a 1.21-m
long stainless steel nursery feeder, and two
nipple waterers. Rooms were HEPA filtered
and had negative pressure ventilation. Prior
to the study, rooms and equipment were
cleaned by pressure washing and then dis-
infected using a quaternary ammonium
compound (Roccal-D Plus; Pharmacia &
Upjohn Company, Kalamazoo, Michigan)
according to label directions. Swab samples
randomly collected from the pen floor, wa-
terer, feeder, and room floor of each room
after the disinfectant dried were culturally
negative prior to pig entry. The drains un-
der the pig decks were plugged with steel
wool and covered with plastic during the
study, such that material in the university
sewage system could not back up into the
rooms. Pigs were fed ad libitum a non-
medicated diet formulated for nursery pigs.
Description and administration of
E coli inoculum
The inoculum was E coli strain M1823B
(kindly donated by Dr Harley Moon), a
porcine strain of serotype O157:H43.8
This strain expresses K88 and F41 fimbriae
and produces heat labile enterotoxin (LT)
as well as heat stable enterotoxin b (Stb).
For administration to the Inoculated Pigs,
strain M1823B in trypticase soy broth was
diluted 1 vol:1 vol in liquid strawberry
gelatin (Jell-O gelatin dessert, Strawberry;
Kraft Foods Inc, Rye Brook, New York).
Pilot studies demonstrated that E coli vi-
ability was not affected by a 1 vol:1 vol
dilution in Jell-O (S.F. Amass, DVM, PhD,
Diplomate ABVP, and J.L. Schneider, un-
published data, 2001).
The inoculum was administered to the In-
oculated Pigs on two occasions. The first
administration was on the day of arrival
(Day 0), approximately 2 hours after fecal
samples had been collected and the pigs
were allocated to rooms. The inoculum was
offered to each individual pig. Twelve of
the 20 Inoculated Pigs consumed the chal-
lenge inoculum on Day 0 at a dose of 2.23
× 1010 to 8.92 × 1010 colony forming units
(cfu) per pig.
On Day 2, 48 hours after the initial chal-
lenge inoculation, Inoculated Pigs were
individually offered fresh challenge inocu-
lum. Eighteen of 20 Inoculated Pigs con-
sumed the inoculum at a dose of 1.36 ×
1010 to 2.04 × 1010 cfu per pig.
As a consequence of this method of inocu-
lation, one of 20 Inoculated Pigs did not
consume inoculum, and ten of 20 Inocu-
lated Pigs consumed inoculum on two oc-
casions. The number of times that a pig
consumed inoculum was considered irrel-
evant to the study design, because the pen
was the experimental unit. Therefore, as
long as one pig in the pen was inoculated
successfully, the E coli would presumably
infect other pigs, which would act as the
source of E coli to be transmitted.
Study design
A single replicate of this study was con-
ducted. All pigs arrived at the isolation fa-
cility at the same time (Day 0).
On arrival, a fecal sample was collected
from each pig to confirm that all were cul-
ture-negative for the E coli inoculum strain.
Approximately 2 hours after sampling was
completed (Day 0), E coli M1823B was
offered to Inoculated Pigs, which were re-
moved to a separate pen in the same room
for the inoculation procedure. Seventeen
hours after arrival (Day 1), the five Pen
Sentinels were placed in the pen with the
Inoculated Pigs. On Day 2, 48 hours after
the initial challenge inoculation, Inocu-
lated Pigs were again moved to a separate
pen in the same room for the second in-
oculation, to avoid exposing the Pen Senti-
nels to the inoculum. After inoculation
procedures were repeated, the Inoculated
Pigs were returned to the pen they shared
with the Pen Sentinels.
Starting on Day 1 and continuing for 10
consecutive days, the four groups of senti-
nel pigs (Table 1) were exposed to the In-
oculated Pigs either directly or by exposure
to people who contacted the Inoculated
Pigs (Table 2).
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Table 1: Treatments for six groups of 19- to 21-day-old weaned pigs in a study
to determine whether people can mechanically transmit enterotoxigenic
Escherichia coli from infected to susceptible pigs during direct pig contact
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Rectal swabs for fecal culture were collected
from all pigs on Days 2, 4, and 7. Pigs that
exhibited diarrhea, other than Inoculated
Pigs, were removed from the room, hu-
manely euthanized, and sampled for bacte-
rial culture and histopathology. All Inocu-
lated Pigs, sentinel pigs that did not exhibit
diarrhea, and Non-exposed Pigs were hu-
manely euthanized and sampled on Day
11.
Personnel procedures
Inoculated and sentinel pigs were cared for
by a single caretaker, and Non-exposed Pigs
were cared for by a separate caretaker, who
was the only person to enter that room
during the course of the study. Hallway
traffic patterns were delineated such that
caretakers did not cross paths. Each care-
taker had a designated shower facility. Stan-
dard shower facilities with clean and con-
taminated sides were used. Both caretakers
followed the same procedures. Caretakers
wore minimal undergarments that did not
protrude from coveralls. Immediately after
entering a room, each caretaker donned
room-designated, short-sleeved cloth cover-
alls and boots just inside the door. The
caretaker for Inoculated and sentinel pigs
wore rubber boots and the caretaker for
Non-exposed Pigs wore disposable plastic
boots.
Caretakers fed pigs from outside the pens,
set a timer for 10 minutes, and then
climbed into the decks with the pigs. In
the decks, caretakers checked waterers and
stood in direct contact with pigs for 10
minutes. Pigs were observed for clinical
signs of diarrhea, and occurrence of diar-
rhea was recorded. Both caretakers picked
up each pig during sampling on Days 2, 4,
and 7. The caretaker for Inoculated Pigs
and sentinels picked up pigs in which the
act of defecation was not observed, pal-
pated the abdomen, and examined the
perineal area for diarrhea. Pigs were also
picked up to assist in reading ear tag num-
bers, and diarrheic pigs were picked up to
remove them from the room. Most Inocu-
lated Pigs and sentinels were handled by
the caretaker during the observation pe-
riod. The caretaker for Non-Exposed Pigs
rarely handled pigs except during sampling.
These procedures were repeated daily for
10 consecutive days. Pigs were cared for in
a consistent order, testing increasing levels
of biosecurity (Table 2).
Hand-washing procedures were imple-
mented as follows: Prior to hand washing,
the caretaker doffed room-designated
clothes and boots in the Inoculated Pigs
room and then washed hands in that room.
The caretaker then entered the Hand-wash
Sentinel room, donned room-designated
clothes and boots, and rewashed hands.
Hand washing consisted of washing hands
with soap (Dial antibacterial liquid soap;
Dial Corporation, Scottsdale, Arizona) and
warm water until organic material was no
longer visible, and then drying hands with
a paper towel.
Showering consisted of shampooing hair
(Equate Herbal Shampoo with rose hips,
vitamin E, and jojoba, Vi-Jon Laboratories
Inc, St Louis, Missouri) and washing with
soap (Body Essence Moisturizing Tangerine
Spice Body Wash Bath and Shower Gel,
Puretek Corp, San Fernando, California)
and warm water until no organic material
was visible and then towel-drying. Finger-
nail brushes were not used during hand
washing or showering.
Pig removal procedures
On Days 1 through 10 of the study, non-
inoculated pigs exhibiting diarrhea during
an observation period were carefully re-
moved (to avoid cross-contamination of
other rooms) at the end of that observation
period. Briefly, after observation in each
room, the caretaker carried each diarrheic
pig to the room door and handed it, with-
out touching the investigator, to a separate
Table 2: Daily care procedures for weaned pigs in a study to determine whether people can mechanically transmit
enterotoxigenic Escherichia coli from infected to susceptible pigs during direct pig contact (Days 1 to 10)
1 Pen Sentinels were housed in the same pen with the Inoculated Pigs except during the inoculation procedures on Day 0 and Day 2.
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clean investigator standing in the hallway
wearing nitrile gloves, cloth coveralls, and
disposable boots. The investigator put the
hindquarters of the pig into a disposable
plastic boot (which was not reused) to pre-
vent hallway contamination. The investiga-
tor carried the pig to the main door of the
facility and placed it directly into a covered
cart outside the facility. When all the pigs
to be euthanized from a single room were
in the cart, it was transported to the door
of the diagnostic laboratory. The clean in-
vestigator then handed pigs to a third in-
vestigator who took them into the diagnos-
tic laboratory. Organic material was
washed from the cart and it was disinfected
(Roccal-D Plus) and transported back to
the outside door of the animal housing
facility to pick up pigs from the next room.
The clean investigator donned fresh nitrile
gloves and boots for each group of pigs,
and fresh coveralls if coveralls became
soiled while carrying pigs. The transport
cart never entered the diagnostic laboratory
or the animal housing facility. On Day 11,
pigs were removed by group from least to
most contaminated (ie, Non-exposed Pigs
first, Inoculated Pigs last) and transported
to the diagnostic laboratory.
Collection of samples and diagnos-
tic evaluation
Caretakers recorded presence or absence of
diarrhea in each pig daily.
Rectal swab samples for fecal culture were
collected from all pigs at entry (Day 0) and
on Days 2, 4, 7, and 11 using sterile swabs
in transport media (S/P Brand culturette
system; Baxter Diagnostics Inc, Deerfield,
Illinois). Additional personnel who had not
contacted pigs or E coli M1823B for 5 days
prior to the study assisted with sample col-
lection. Each assistant showered in and was
assigned to a single room. These personnel
did not enter pig pens. The caretaker stood
in the pen and manually restrained each
pig by holding it over the pen divider. The
assistant donned nitrile gloves and clean
outerwear, stood outside the pen, and
swabbed the pig. The caretaker for Non-
exposed Pigs collected all swab samples
without assistance. Immediately after col-
lection, swabs were hand-carried to the
laboratory.
Rectal swabs were cultured for isolation of
E coli with antimicrobial sensitivity pat-
terns characteristic of the challenge isolate.
A maximum of six isolates per room were
further characterized by detection of pilus
and enterotoxin genes using multiplex
polymerase chain reaction (PCR), and for
agglutination with O157 antisera. Detec-
tion of E coli strain M1823B in either the
feces or intestines of sentinels was consid-
ered evidence of mechanical transmission
of the organism. Complete necropsies were
performed on all pigs and gross lesions
were recorded. Two 1-cm sections of
duodenum, jejunum, and ileum were col-
lected and examined microscopically, and
observation of villous atrophy, inflamma-
tion, and non-E coli organisms was
recorded.
Culture of fecal swabs and
identification of isolates
Fecal swabs were inoculated on MacConkey
agar prepared, according to the manu-
facturer’s instructions (Difco Laboratories,
Detroit, Michigan), with 80 µg per ml
nalidixic acid (Sigma-Aldrich, St Louis,
Missouri) and 30 µg per ml tetracycline
(Sigma-Aldrich). The samples were
streaked for isolation and plates were cul-
tured at 37˚C for 18 to 24 hours. Colonies
that grew on this agar, were lactose-posi-
tive, and precipitated bile salts were consid-
ered positive for the inoculum strain.
Recovered E coli isolates were screened for
virulence genes using a multiplex PCR as-
say.9 This assay detects the fimbriae F4
(K88), F5 (K99), F6 (987P), F18, F41,
heat stable enterotoxins (STa, STb), heat
liable enterotoxin, and Shiga toxin 2. Iso-
lates were also confirmed as serotype O157
using a latex agglutination kit (E coli O157
Latex Kit; Oxoid, Blasingstoke, England)
according to the manufacturer’s
instructions.
Table 3: Observation of diarrhea, isolation of Escherichia coli strain M1823B, and microscopic evidence of non-E coli
diarrheic agents in weaned pigs in a study to determine whether people can mechanically transmit enterotoxigenic E coli
from infected to susceptible pigs during direct pig contact1
1     Inoculated Pigs were orally inoculated Days 0 and 2, and Pen Sentinels were housed with them except during inoculation
procedures. On Days 1 through 10, Direct, Hand-wash, and Shower Sentinel groups (Table 1) were contacted according to the
schedule in Table 2.  When diarrhea was observed (except in Inoculated Pigs), affected pigs were immediately euthanized for cultural
and histological examination.
2     Strain M1823B was identified on the basis of antimicrobial sensitivity.
3     Determined by observation of histologic intestinal lesions not characteristic of enterotoxigenic E coli.
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Table 4: Cumulative percentage of weaned pigs1 from which Escherichia coli strain M1823B (challenge strain) was isolated
during sample collection periods on Day 0 (prior to exposure), and Days 2, 4, 7, and 11 after initial exposure by inoculation
(Inoculated Pigs) or direct (Pen Sentinels) or indirect exposure to the Inoculated Pigs.2
1     Inoculated Pigs were orally inoculated Days 0 and 2, and Pen Sentinels were housed with them except during inoculation
procedures. On Days 1 through 10, Direct, Hand-wash, and Shower Sentinel groups (Table 1) were contacted according to the
schedule in Table 2.  When diarrhea was observed (except in Inoculated Pigs), affected pigs were immediately euthanized for cultural
and histological examination. Pigs determined to be positive on a designated sample collection day or on the day of euthanasia were
counted as positive for all subsequent sample collection periods.
2     Inoculated Pigs were individually offered 1.36 to 8.92 × 1010 colony forming units of E coli M1823B in liquid strawberry gelatin.
3     Strain M1823B was identified on the basis of antimicrobial sensitivity.
Statistical analysis
Mean and median times from Day 0 to
detection of E coli M1823B in pigs were
calculated for comparison of Direct Senti-
nels and Hand-wash Sentinels. The data
for this period was nonparametric, and the
Mann Whitney test was used, with P<.05
considered statistically significant. As E coli
M1823B was not detected in the Shower
Sentinels, this group was not compared to
Direct Sentinels and Hand-wash Sentinels.
GraphPad InStat version 3.00 for Windows
95 (GraphPad Software, San Diego, Cali-
fornia) was used for statistical calculations.
Results
Non-exposed Pigs
Non-exposed Pigs did not exhibit diarrhea
during the study (Table 3) and were cul-
ture-negative for E coli strain M1823B at
all data collection points (Table 4).
Inoculated Pigs
Escherichia coli strain M1823B (identified
on the basis of antimicrobial sensitivity re-
sults) was isolated from each Inoculated Pig
at one or more data collection points (Table
3). Escherichia coli was first detected on Day
2 (mean ± SD = 2.35 ± 1.182 days; median
= 2 days) (Table 4). Moreover, isolates from
six pigs were further characterized by latex
agglutination and multiplex PCR, and all
six (100%) were determined to be Escheri-
chia coli strain M1823B.
Many Inoculated Pigs exhibited diarrhea;
however, some of these pigs had micro-
scopic lesions associated with other causes
of diarrhea (Table 3), including villous at-
rophy, inflammation, or both in seven pigs;
organisms consistent with Cryptosporidium
species in two pigs; and villous atrophy,
inflammation, and organisms consistent
with Cryptosporidium species in one pig.
Pen Sentinels
Escherichia coli strain M1823B (identified
on the basis of antimicrobial sensitivity
results) was isolated from each Pen Sentinel
at one or more data collection points, and
isolates were confirmed to be strain
M1823B by latex agglutination and multi-
plex PCR (Table 3). Escherichia coli was
first detected on Day 2 (mean ± SD = 3.2
± 1.095 days; median = 4 days) (Table 4).
Diarrhea was observed in only three of the
five Pen Sentinels. All three pigs with diar-
rhea were culture-positive for strain
M1823B, but one of them had micro-
scopic intestinal lesions of inflammation
(Table 3).
Direct Sentinels
Escherichia coli strain M1823B (identified
on the basis of antimicrobial sensitivity
results) was isolated from 80% of Direct
Sentinels at one or more data collection
points (Table 3). Escherichia coli was first
detected on Day 4 (mean ± SD = 6 ±
2.828 days; median = 4 days) (Table 4). Six
of the six isolates tested were confirmed to
be strain M1823B by latex agglutination
and multiplex PCR.
Diarrhea was observed in only 9 of the 11
Direct Sentinels that were culture-positive
for E coli M1823B (Table 3). Seven of
these pigs (64%) had microscopic intesti-
nal lesions of villous atrophy, inflamma-
tion, or both.
Hand-wash Sentinels
Escherichia coli strain M1823B (identified
on the basis of antimicrobial sensitivity
results) was isolated from 92% of Hand-
wash Sentinels (Table 3). Escherichia coli
was first detected on Day 7 (mean ± SD =
8.565 ± 2.063 days; median = 7 days)
(Table 4). Time from Day 0 to the day of
detection of E coli during set sampling pe-
riods was longer for Hand-wash Sentinels
compared to Direct Sentinels (P=.002). Six
of the six isolates tested were confirmed to
be strain M1823B by multiplex PCR.
Diarrhea was observed in only four Hand-
wash Sentinels, and three of these were cul-
ture-positive for E coli M1823B (Table 3).
All four pigs exhibiting diarrhea had
microscopic intestinal lesions of villous
atrophy, inflammation, or both.
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Shower Sentinels
Diarrhea was observed in three Shower Sen-
tinels; however, all pigs remained culture-
negative for E coli strain M1823B at all data
collection points (Tables 3 and 4). Two of
the three pigs exhibiting diarrhea had micro-
scopic intestinal lesions of inflammation,
and organisms consistent with Cryptospor-
idium species were observed in the third pig.
Discussion
To test the mechanical transmission of E coli
by people, pigs in direct contact with Inocu-
lated Pigs (Pen Sentinels), pigs in contact
with people exposed to Inoculated Pigs (Di-
rect Sentinels), Non-exposed Pigs (negative
controls), and two intervention groups
(Hand-wash Sentinels and Shower Senti-
nels) were compared. The Inoculated Pigs
group, which were the source of E coli to be
transmitted, were directly infected by con-
sumption of E coli strain M1823B or indi-
rectly infected by contact with pen mates
who had consumed E coli strain M1823B.
These pigs were actively shedding E coli
strain M1823B, as evidenced by transmis-
sion to Pen Sentinels housed in the same
pen. The caretaker for Inoculated and Senti-
nel Pigs was exposed to Inoculated Pigs im-
mediately before each intervention was used.
Exposures were repeated once a day for 10
days such that each intervention was strin-
gently tested.
Microscopic examination of intestine was
employed because diarrhea may have mul-
tiple etiologies. The villous atrophy and
inflammation observed in some pigs are not
consistent with ETEC, but could explain
alternate causes of diarrhea. The herd of ori-
gin of the experimental pigs was clinically
negative for TGEV and rotavirus and was
serologically negative for antibodies to
TGEV (Svanovir; Svanova Biotech, Uppsala,
Sweden). Three of the pigs with villous atro-
phy tested negative for both TGEV and
rotavirus by immunohistochemistry. Organ-
isms consistent with Cryptosporidium species
were observed on microscopic examination
of intestine from some pigs. Thus, in some
cases, a pig with diarrhea might have been
removed from this trial before exposure to E
coli M1823B. This limitation should not
have affected overall study results, as the pen
was the experimental unit. Use of multiplex
PCR in conjunction with bacterial culture
provided highly sensitive and more specific
diagnostic techniques to confirm coloniza-
tion of sentinel pigs by our challenge strain
of E coli M1823B, despite the presence of
other etiologic agents of diarrhea.
The results of this study support the asser-
tion that people can act as mechanical vec-
tors of E coli when moving between groups
of infected and susceptible pigs. Moreover,
mechanical transmission occurred without
extraordinary measures being taken to en-
hance caretaker contact with pig excretions
and secretion beyond that which would oc-
cur in a typical pork production unit. A
more virulent isolate than that used in this
study conceivably would need a smaller dose
to cause disease; thus, any transmission is
important.
Our results provide evidence that washing
hands and donning clean outerwear was
insufficient to prevent mechanical transmis-
sion of E coli by the caretaker in our study.
One reason for the failure of this interven-
tion in our study is that hand washing was
not sufficient to remove all E coli-containing
organic material from hands of the care-
taker, such as deep under the fingernails.
The caretaker washed her hands until all
visible organic material was removed. How-
ever, a fingernail brush was not used during
hand washing in this study, and E coli could
have been invisibly carried deep under the
fingernails. Alternative explanations are that
a pig contacted an infectious dose of E coli
from contaminated parts of the caretaker
such as her face, mouth, neck, arms, or hair,
because hand washing did not remove E coli
from these body parts. Although due care
was taken, the caretaker might have inadver-
tently touched a contaminated body part
after hand washing. In contrast, showering
and donning clean outerwear was sufficient
to prevent transmission of E coli this study.
Presumably, showering provided a whole-
body decontamination procedure that was
effective in removing organic material from
other exposed areas in addition to the
hands. Material carried under fingernails
was possibly removed during hair washing.
However, time from Day 0 to the day of
detection of E coli during set sampling peri-
ods was longer for Hand-wash Sentinels
compared to Direct Sentinels, suggesting
that hand washing and donning clean outer-
wear decreased the number of organisms
carried by the investigator such that it took
longer to achieve an infectious dose in senti-
nel pigs. The infectious dose might have
been achieved by repeated contacts with the
caretaker until an infectious dose was
reached, contact with an infected pen mate
in which the delay was the result of time
needed for the E coli to replicate within the
infected pig and be shed to pen mates, or,
more likely, a combination of the two
events. The results of this study suggest that
hand washing and donning clean outerwear
as performed in this study is not a sufficient
biosecurity measure to prevent transmission
of E coli. Thus, shower-in facilities might be
considered for production units that are us-
ing some biosecurity measures (eg, isolation
and acclimatization facilities, all-in, all-out
pig flow with cleaning and disinfection be-
tween groups, hand washing, boot chang-
ing, and coverall changing before entry), but
are still experiencing uncontrollable losses
due to E coli.
Previous studies have examined the role of
people in mechanical transmission of por-
cine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
virus (PRRSV) and TGEV. In the first
study,10 contamination of people was ac-
complished by having ten people sit in a pen
with viremic, PRRSV-inoculated pigs for 1
hour. People handled the pigs as the pigs
chewed on the coveralls and rubber boots
worn by the participants. Extraordinary
measures (beyond those which would be
used in a typical pork production unit) were
not undertaken to enhance contamination
of participants with PRRSV. Five partici-
pants then contacted sentinel pigs in the
same manner without employing biosecu-
rity measures. The remaining five partici-
pants showered, donned clean coveralls and
boots, and then contacted a second group of
sentinel pigs in same manner. Sentinel pigs
had separate caretakers and were monitored
for clinical signs of PRRSV for 23 days after
exposure to contaminated people, at which
time sentinel pigs were euthanized and
samples were collected for PRRSV isolation
and serology. In this study, PRRS viral RNA
was detected in saliva and fingernail rinse
samples from two of ten people immediately
after exposure to PRRSV-inoculated pigs, in
a fingernail rinse sample from a third person
at 5 hours after exposure to PRRSV-inocu-
lated pigs, and in a nasal swab sample from
a fourth person at 48 hours after exposure to
PRRSV-inoculated pigs.10 Virus
isolation was not performed in this study;
therefore, the viability, infectiousness, and
amount of the virus contaminating partici-
pants remained unknown. Despite contami-
nation, people did not act as mechanical
vectors for PRRSV to sentinel pigs in this
study. This study was limited because only a
single replication was performed. Moreover,
investigators could not prove that PRRSV-
inoculated pigs were shedding an infectious
dose of PRRSV because uninoculated pigs
were not housed with inoculated pigs to act
as sentinels for transmissibility.
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In the second study,11 contamination of
personnel was extensive and accomplished
by having the investigator don boots and
coveralls and spend 1 hour in a room with
PRRSV-inoculated pigs biting and licking
hands, coveralls, and boots. During the
hour, the investigator picked up each of
seven PRRSV-inoculated pigs and per-
formed the following tasks: placed the
PRRSV-inoculated pig’s snout on the dorsal
and ventral surface of each hand and rubbed
the snout repeatedly across the boots and
coveralls; placed each hand in the pig’s
mouth for 5 seconds; sprayed blood from
the PRRSV-inoculated pig over the cover-
alls, boots, and dorsal and ventral surfaces of
hands; and, picked up a handful of fecal
material which was spread on the hands,
boots and coveralls of the investigator. Thus,
extraordinary measures not performed on a
typical pork production unit were imple-
mented to contaminate personnel. Investi-
gators then moved to rooms of sentinel pigs
after using no biosecurity procedures, wash-
ing hands and changing clothes and boots,
or showering and changing clothes and
boots with and without a 12-hour animal
avoidance period. The investigator using no
biosecurity procedures moved directly to
sentinel pigs without changing clothes,
boots, or washing hands. The investigator
contacted sentinel pigs for 30 minutes in a
similar fashion as stated above, but without
exposure to blood or feces of sentinel pigs.
Following exposure, the investigator doffed
contaminated clothes and boots and left
them in the pen with sentinel pigs for 24
hours. Four replications were performed. In
this study, PRRSV was detected on the
hands of one person in one of four replicates
by PCR and swine bioassay. Infection of
sentinel pigs by PRRSV was demonstrated
in two of four replicates when biosecurity
procedures were not used and contaminated
coveralls and boots were left in the pen with
sentinel pigs. Infection of sentinel pigs was
not demonstrated in other treatment
groups. One limitation of this study was
that the extensive procedures used to con-
taminate personnel with PRRSV did not
reflect conditions on typical pork produc-
tion units. Thus, isolation of PRRSV from
the hands of personnel after such gross con-
tamination was not surprising. The primary
limitation of this study was that the investi-
gator using no biosecurity procedures left
contaminated outerwear in the pen of senti-
nel pigs for 24 hours following human ex-
posure. While again not reflective of condi-
tions on a typical pork production unit, this
action confounded the examination of hu-
man transmission. Specifically, one could
not determine if the 30 minutes of human
contact was sufficient to transmit PRRSV to
sentinel pigs or if the source of PRRSV was
the grossly contaminated coveralls and boots
that the pigs had presumably chewed on for
up to 24 hours. Thus, although both studies
found evidence of PRRSV contamination of
people after exposure to PRRSV-infected
pigs, neither study effectively examined
whether people could indeed mechanically
transmit PRRSV to susceptible pigs. With-
out this knowledge, the effectiveness of in-
tervention strategies cannot be assessed, be-
cause if people cannot mechanically
transmit PRRSV, intervention strategies are
not needed.
The single replicate study using TGEV
found that hand washing and donning clean
outerwear and boots was sufficient to pre-
vent mechanical transmission of TGEV
from inoculated pigs to susceptible pigs un-
der experimental conditions.6 In this study,
the caretaker moved among groups of pigs
using increasing levels of biosecurity. The
caretaker had direct contact with TGEV-
Inoculated pigs, then used no biosecurity
and contacted Direct Sentinels, then washed
hands twice and changed outerwear and
contacted Hand-wash Sentinels, and, finally,
showered and changed outwear before con-
tacting Shower Sentinels. Pigs were con-
tacted by the caretaker in this order for a 10-
minute period, twice per day, for 14 days.
The caretaker did not recontact TGEV-In-
oculated pigs between contacts with Senti-
nel pigs. Hand-washing procedures used in
the TGEV study were identical to those
used in the E coli study, and antimicrobial
soaps were used in both studies. The senti-
nel pigs in the TGEV study were seronega-
tive and susceptible to TGEV, but were ≥4
weeks old when exposed. Thus, due to their
age, these pigs might have been less suscep-
tible to a presumably smaller dose of TGEV
transmitted after hand washing, whereas the
presumably larger dose of virus transmitted
by the investigator when biosecurity proce-
dures were not used was sufficient to cause
infection despite the age of the pigs. Hand
washing might not have been effective if
younger sentinel pigs had been used in the
study.
Conflicting results in biosecurity trials are
not surprising. We hypothesize that the ef-
fectiveness of biosecurity procedures needed
to prevent mechanical transmission of
pathogens by people is variable due to the
vast differences among pathogens and host
susceptibilities. For example, the nature
(pathogen, commensal), type (Gram-nega-
tive bacterium, Gram-positive bacterium,
enveloped virus, nonenveloped virus) infec-
tiousness, and contagiousness of the organ-
ism must be considered. Moreover, host sus-
ceptibility depends on many factors,
including, but not limited to age,
immunocompetency, vaccination status,
genetic predisposition, concurrent illness,
stress, environment, management, and nu-
trition. The frequency of exposure and
routes of transmission will also impact the
efficacy of biosecurity protocols. In the field,
large populations of swine, lack of compli-
ance by personnel, large pathogen loads, and
incorrectly performed or inadequate facility
sanitation may all confound the efficacy of
biosecurity procedures. Consequently, one
would not expect a single biosecurity proto-
col to be efficacious in all cases.
For the above reasons, caution must be
taken when interpreting our results, because
the study consisted of only a single replicate,
and repeatability of our results is unknown.
Moreover, the effectiveness of biosecurity
interventions tested in this study may not
reflect their efficacy under field conditions.
The inherent variability in efficacy of
biosecurity protocols exemplifies the need
for further experimental and field studies to
evaluate confounding factors on protocol
efficacy. Thus, producers and veterinarians
are encouraged to test biosecurity interven-
tions on their farms to determine the most
effective and appropriate biosecurity mea-
sures for their specific situation.
Finally, the presence of E coli strain
M1823B in pigs without diarrhea empha-
sizes the importance of strict personal hy-
giene to prevent mechanical transmission of
pathogens. Many times, biosecurity proce-
dures are implemented on farms in response
to a disease outbreak. Biosecurity protocols
must be implemented in a proactive man-
ner, because people may mechanically trans-
mit organisms among groups of pigs before
clinical signs become apparent.
Implications
• People can mechanically transmit E
coli among groups of pigs.
• Under the conditions of this study,
hand washing and donning clean
outerwear delayed, but did not
prevent, the mechanical transmission
of E coli by the caretaker.
• Under the conditions of this study,
showering and donning clean outer-
wear prevented the mechanical
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transmission of E coli by the caretaker.
• Subclinical colonization of pigs with
E coli emphasizes the need for
proactive biosecurity procedures.
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Weights and measures conversions
Temperature equivalents
°F = (°C × 9/5) + 32
°C = (°F - 32) × 5/9
Conversion chart, kg to lb
)SU(nommoC cirteM trevnocoT ybylpitluM
zo1 g53.82 gotzo 82
)zo61(bl1 g95.354 gkotbl 54.0
bl2.2 gk1 blotgk 2.2
ni1 mc45.2 mcotni 45.2
ni93.0 mc1 niotmc 93.0
)ni21(tf1 m13.0 mottf 3.0
tf82.3 m1 tfotm 82.3
im1 mk6.1 mkotim 6.1
im26.0 mk1 imotmk 6.0
niqs1 mc5.6 2 mcotniqs 2 5.6
niqs51.0 mc1 2 mc 2 niqsot 51.0
tfqs1 m90.0 2 mottfqs 2 90.0
tfqs11.11 m1 2 m2 tfqsot 11
tfuc1 m30.0 3 mottfuc 3 30.0
tfuc23.53 m1 3 m3 tfucot 53
)puc(c1 L42.0 Lotc 42.0
c7661.4 L1 cotL 2.4
)zolf821(lag1 L8.3 Lotlag 8.3
lag462.0 L1 lagotL 62.0
)zolf23(tq1 Lm63.649 Lottq 59.0
zo8318.33 L1 tqotL 1.1
C° F°
0 23
01 05
5.51 06
61 16
3.81 56
1.12 07
8.32 57
6.62 08
82 28
4.92 58
2.23 09
8.83 201
4.93 301
0.04 401
5.04 501
1.14 601
001 212
ezisgiP gK bL
htriB 0.2–5.1 4.4–3.3
gninaeW 5.3 7.7
5 11
01 22
yresruN 51 33
02 44
52 55
03 66
reworG 54 99
05 011
06 231
rehsiniF 09 891
001 022
501 132
011 242
511 352
woS 531 003
003 166
raoB 063 008
Conversion tables
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